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Abstract
PARIS: A PArallel RSA-prime InSpection tool
Joseph White
Modern-day computer security relies heavily on cryptography as a means to
protect the data that we have become increasingly reliant on. As the Internet
becomes more ubiquitous, methods of security must be better than ever. Valida-
tion tools can be leveraged to help increase our confidence and accountability for
methods we employ to secure our systems.
Security validation, however, can be difficult and time-consuming. As our
computational ability increases, calculations that were once considered “hard”
due to length of computation, can now be done in minutes. We are constantly
increasing the size of our keys and attempting to make computations harder
to protect our information. This increase in “cracking” difficulty often has the
unfortunate side-effect of making validation equally as difficult.
We can leverage massive-parallelism and the computational power that is
granted by today’s commodity hardware such as GPUs to make checks that would
otherwise be impossible to perform, attainable. Our work presents a practical
tool for validating RSA keys for poor prime numbers: a fundamental problem that
has led to significant security holes, despite the RSA algorithm’s mathematical
soundness.
iv
Our tool, PARIS, leverages NVIDIA’s CUDA framework to perform a com-
plete set of greatest common divisor calculations between all keys in a provided
set. Our implementation offers a 27.5 times speedup using a GTX 480 and 33.9
times speedup using a Tesla K20Xm: both compared to a reference sequential
implementation for sets of less than 200000 keys. This level of speedup brings
this validation into the realm of practicality due to decreased runtime.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
RSA (named for its inventors, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman
[11]) is a public key encryption scheme which relies on the difficulty of factoring
large numbers. The algorithm is prevalent throughout computer security, and
is specifically used for many web-security applications (see §3). An RSA key
contains public and private components, both of which are calculated based on
two randomly-generated prime values: p and q (RSA is explained at greater
length in §2.1). Ideally, given the number of possible primes that may be used to
construct a 1024-bit key, no random number generators should reuse either prime,
and all keys should contain unique components. Thus, the likelihood of either p
or q being repeated in a set of keys should be approximately 0. Since in reality,
random number generation is difficult, and often less than random, primes are,
in fact, repeated. Due to this, an individual key may be considered secure by
itself, but when compared to other keys might exhibit a weakness which allows
each key’s private components to be calculated entirely from public information
(Figure 2.1).
When considering two keys, a weakness exists when the greatest common
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divisor (GCD) of both moduli, n1 and n2, is greater than 1. If GCD(n1, n2) = p,
then p must be a shared prime factor of n1 and n2. Thus, q1 =
n1
p
and q2 =
n2
p
.
Once p and q are known, d1 and d2 (values in the private components) can be
directly calculated, yielding both private key pairs.
This weakness is discussed in [7], which shows a significant number of existing
RSA keys were susceptible to this exploit. The primary goal of our work was to
speedup the most computationally intensive part of their process by implementing
the GCD comparisons of RSA 1024-bit keys using NVIDIA’s CUDA platform.
To aid in accomplishing this goal, Fujimoto’s GPU-based GCD calculation [3]
was expanded and adapted to compare all combinations of keys in a given set. In
comparison to their work, our implementation allows larger sections of the algo-
rithm to be executed in parallel, resulting in further speedup. We implemented
our initial tool and successfully applied it to sets of RSA moduli [16]. Our initial
work ([16]) was only capable of validating a single set of keys whose size was
constrained by the GPU memory. In our new version of PARIS, presented in
this paper, we overcome this limitation, and add the ability to process arbitrarily
sized sets of RSA keys.
1.1 The Meaning of PARIS
The title of our validation tool has meaning beyond its descriptive acronym,
and contains ties to Greek Mythology. The Greek hero Achilles was known for his
greatness and is the central character of many Greek myths including Homer’s
epic, The Iliad [2]. He is probably best known for his single fatal weakness:
his heel. According to myth, his body was made invulnerable at birth by being
dipped into the river Styx. This invulnerability made him the great warrior that
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he was; however, his mother held him by his heel as she dipped him into the
river, leaving it exposed and thus vulnerable. This marks his weakness, and after
a short life filled with battle and warfare, a fatal arrow wound through his heel
results in his death.
We look to this myth as an analogy for the RSA algorithm. RSA can be viewed
as Achilles: a character with epic strength (i.e. mathematical soundness) capable
of feats never before possible (i.e. cryptographic communications). However, it
has a single, fatal flaw: random prime numbers. This weakness, for Achilles, was
exposed by an arrow shot by Paris, Prince of Troy. It is here, that we derive our
tool’s name.
We use Paris because he exposed the weakness in a great hero. In the same
way, we aim to make finding the flaw of poor random number generation in RSA
keys a more public and accessible task.
3
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 RSA
RSA is an asymmetric key encryption scheme. Keys come in matched pairs:
a public key and a private key. The public key is comprised of a modulus n of
specified length (the product of primes p and q), and an exponent e. The length of
n is given in terms of bits, thus the term “1024-bit RSA key” refers to the number
of bits which make up this value. The associated private key uses the same n,
and another value d such that d · e = 1 mod φ(n) where φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q − 1)
[11].
Using the same algorithm, information encrypted with the one key can be
decrypted with the other and vice versa. A party must keep the private key
secret, but the public portion of the key can be seen and used by anyone in the
world. To generate a public-private key pair, an algorithm is implemented using
two randomly-generated prime numbers whose product is of a certain bit-length
(e.g. 1024 bits). PARIS aims to uncover the inadequacies present in these primes.
4
Figure 2.1. Explanation of poor-prime vulnerability
2.2 CUDA
NVIDIA’s Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) is a platform that
provides a set of tools along with the ability to write programs that make use of
NVIDIA’s GPUs (cf. [9]). These massively-parallel hardware devices are capable
of processing large amounts of data simultaneously, allowing significant speedups
in programs with sections of parallelizable code using the Simultaneous Program,
Multiple Data (SPMD) model. The platform allows for various arrangements of
threads to perform work, based on the developer’s decomposition of the problem.
Our solution is discussed in §6.2. In general, individual threads are grouped into
up-to 3-dimensional blocks to allow sharing of common memory between threads.
These blocks can then be organized into a 2-dimensional grid.
The GPU breaks the total number of threads into groups called warps, which,
on current GPU hardware, consist of 32 threads that will be executed simulta-
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neously on a single streaming multiprocessor (SM). The GPU consists of several
SMs which are each capable of executing a warp. Blocks are scheduled to SMs
until all allocated threads have been executed.
There is also a memory hierarchy on the GPU. Three of the various types
of memory are relevant to this work: global memory is the slowest and largest;
shared memory is much faster, but also significantly smaller; and a limited num-
ber of registers that each SM has access to. Each thread in a block can access
the same section of shared memory.
6
Chapter 3
Motivation
Despite PARIS’s focus on performance and speedup of the vulnerability check,
its impacts and implications to computer security are equally important. We look
into some of RSA’s more popular applications to help motivate why our work and
PARIS’s increase in practicality is important to the world of computer security.
We aim to discuss what types of data might be vulnerable due to this exploit (as
well as others affecting RSA), impacts the vulnerability has, and put a portion of
the current state of computer security into a real-world context concerning RSA.
Most initial research yielded general statements that did not explain or give
appropriate context to RSA (statements like “. . . all over the Internet. . . ” were
accurate, but not informative). More in-depth research yielded two primary
use-cases of RSA: Digital Rights Management (DRM) and Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) Internet security protocols. Other uses
included password alternatives (e.g. ssh connections or command line interface
tools like git) but these are more difficult to collect data for and analyze since
they tend to be done on an individual basis, and are managed by individual users.
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3.1 Digital Rights Management
Digital rights management is a protocol used to secure the usage and distri-
bution of various types of media content. It is adopted by content providers and
device manufacturers to ensure users don’t misuse or wrongfully share protected,
copyrighted content. The RSA Association proposed a protocol that could be
applied to various types of media content that secured its usage [13, 14]. These
announcements argued that using RSA for DRM offered benefits to the content
providers, the device manufacturers, and, arguably, the consumers of the content.
It allows device manufactures and content providers to ensure proper usage of
protected content while allowing users to consume and playback their rightfully-
owned media on an array of their own devices.
3.2 Internet Security and Certificates
Internet security relies on a particular protocol called SSL and its successor
TLS. These protocols define how to securely transfer information over the Internet
by using encryption and signing mechanisms. One aspect of both the SSL and
TLS protocols involve certificates to ensure the expected party is actually being
communicated with. These certificates provide information about a server that
a user is connected to (e.g. Amazon or Google) and is signed by a certificate
authority (e.g., VeriSign). These certificates are also encrypted with a subject’s
(e.g., Amazon’s) public key to ensure that the entity is who they say they are.
Furthermore, the public key is then used to transfer information back to the
subject in a secure way.
The most widely used type of certificate is the X.509 certificate, whose current
8
Figure 3.1. X.509 Fields [5]
revision is 3. A breakdown of the major sections of the certificate is shown in
Figure 3.1. The “Subject Public Key Information” section of the certificate holds
the relevant data (the subject’s RSA public key) for our work. The public key
portion of the certificates can actually use one of several algorithms defined in
the specification. RSA is by far the most popular, accounting for over half of the
found certificates (as shown in Figure 3.2). Other options include DSA and Diffie-
Hellman. For more detailed information about X.509 certificates and analysis on
their infrastructure, see [5].
3.3 Data Collection
The proposed DRM protocol given by the RSA Association closely follows the
certificate model used by SSL/TLS. For this reason, the SSL certificate model was
the primary focus of the data collected. Moreover, the data set of RSA keys in
9
Table 3.1. Major CDN Traffic (2010)
CDN Percent of all
Internet
traffic
Approx.
percentage of
web traffic
Google 7 12.72
LeaseWeb (Heineken,
Starbucks,. . . )
0.8 1.454
Amazon CDN (NASA/JPL,
PBS,. . . )
0.55 1
EdgeCast (Yahoo!, Break,
Imgur,. . . )
0.5 0.909
Facebook 0.45 0.818
SSL certificates is much larger than DRM implementations that use RSA. Thus,
the data set that was collected and then analyzed consisted entirely of X.509
certificates.
Since a primary motivation of this work is the potential impact that vulnerable
RSA keys may have, a data set representative of a large portion of traffic was
desired. A survey was done over 2007-2010 [6] that gathered some useful data on
the Internet as a whole. Relevant to web traffic, this study showed that together,
the major content data networks (CDN) (i.e. Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc.)
account for nearly 17% of web traffic. Specific breakdowns and conversions can
be found in Table 3.1.
Alexa was used to find websites with large amounts of traffic1, as it serves as
one of the Internet’s most prevalent sources for traffic information. In addition to
1http://www.alexa.com/
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individualized site traffic data, Alexa provides a daily-updated list of the top one
million websites ordered by traffic2. In regards to the previous point concerning
CDNs and traffic breakdowns, it was noted that all web sites hosted by the
major CDNs from [6] are present in the top one million list. Additionally, the
vast majority of sites from the top one million list were not provided by the
CDNs mentioned in [6]. This means that a much larger percentage than 17% is
actually represented by the sites in the list, although quantifying precisely how
much becomes difficult, and lies beyond the scope of this project.
A Python script was used to parse the comma separated value (CSV) file
provided by Alexa. Each extracted URL was visited on port 443 (corresponding
to “https://”) using openssl. If a site responded on that port, it provided an
X.509 certificate to be parsed and verified. During a normal web session, this
is done by a user’s web browser which has certificate authorities’ public keys
hidden within. However, since the work here was not concerned with the actual
web content, the certificate was simply saved. When certificates were found,
the “Subject Public Key Algorithm” section was inspected. If this contained
some form of RSA, openssl was used again to extract the RSA key and save it
into a Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) file (a standard format for saving public
and private key information in). Additionally, since part the motivation of data
collection is PARIS, the keys were also stored into a SQLite3 database so that
later retrieval using PARIS was trivial.
Some of Python’s multi-process capabilities were utilized to speed up the
collection of data. Eight processes were spawned to perform the work described
above. Seven of the processes read URLs from a deque (double-ended queue)
and attempted to obtain an X.509 certificate and RSA key from each. When
2http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
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Figure 3.2. Presence of RSA key or other security in Alexa top 1M sites
found, these keys were added to a queue. These data structures not only offered
convenient structures for organizing the data, but were also thread-safe and could
be used with our updated implementation. An eighth thread read keys from
the queue and entered them into the SQLite3 database. This reimplementation
offered a 15× speedup over a single-threaded approach.
3.4 Data Analysis
After collecting data from each of the top one million Alexa sites, some
surface-level analysis was performed in order to gain an overview of the secu-
rity of these one million sites. This analysis included overall security breakdowns
(i.e. whether a site used any kind of security) and bit-length breakdowns of the
RSA keys that were found. This data analysis can be found in Figures 3.2 and
3.3. Table 3.2 shows specific breakdowns for bit-lengths, and offers details that
cannot be seen in the figure.
An interesting (and slightly worrisome) observation is that the majority of
12
Figure 3.3. Breakdown of Alexa top 1M sites’ RSA keys by bit-length
web sites in this top one million list did not even respond on port 443, implying
that they do not allow any option for secure traffic to their site. Nearly 60% of
websites in the list fell into this category.
Also of note are the specifics of key lengths found. It is a surprising data
set for various reasons. First, bit-lengths as small as 384, 512, and 768 were
not expected since keys of this size were factored years ago [12], and cannot be
expected to offer much security.
The fact that the majority of keys were 2048-bit was not expected, but means
that a large number of high-traffic websites have adequate (for now) encryption.
Moreover, there were quite a number of sites with 4096, and, even more surpris-
ingly, 8192-bit.
Following the surface-level analysis, PARIS was used to perform a complete
check of all RSA keys in a set in order to check for the previously mentioned
vulnerability [7]. At the time this data was analyzed, PARIS was limited to
1024-bit RSA keys. Due to this limitation, the data set was reduced to 46,736
13
Table 3.2. Alexa top 1M X.509 RSA bit-length
Bits Count
384 4
512 309
768 4
1024 46736
2048 168391
2432 37
3072 17
4096 4511
8192 14
other 44
RSA keys. The O(n2) nature of this problem resulted in 1, 092, 150, 216 compar-
isons. Running PARIS on this data set took 138 minutes, 37 seconds or 131, 305
comparisons per second. After applying PARIS to this set of keys, it was found
that no keys were susceptible to the vulnerability (insofar as none of the keys in
the set shared primes with any other key in the set). Although no vulnerabilities
were detected, this does not mean the set is completely secure from the previously
mentioned vulnerability. Since such a limited data set was used, and the security
tool relies on large sets to accumulate many primes, the analysis presented can
only be considered an initial pass.
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3.5 Implications
For the same reasons the data set was chosen to be X.509 certificates, presence
of the vulnerability mentioned here would have the largest effect on Internet
security: specifically in the certificate infrastructure. If servers were unknowingly
providing compromised public keys in their certificates, their traffic could offer no
security if this became known. This could offer ill-effects since the vulnerability
is agnostic of the type of data being being encrypted.
Additionally, the password-alternatives that were mentioned briefly before
could be particularly impacted. If a system was generating many new RSA keys
(e.g. a user is building new accounts for various websites, and tying RSA keys to
them) with inadequate primes, potentially all these accounts for this user could
end up compromised, despite the sense of stronger security.
Along these lines, a system administrator could potentially suffer from similar
issues. If many machines and key-pairs are being setup and generated as part
of an initial setup process for a new network of users, poor random number
generation could have severe consequences when done at scale. This would likely
create many new, vulnerable keys at once. By being aware that this problem
could exist, and that a tool such as PARIS exists, an insecure set of keys could
be avoided or detected much earlier than would have otherwise been possible.
15
Chapter 4
Related Works
4.1 The Vulnerability
An RSA vulnerability was discovered and detailed in [7] in early 2012 that
forms the basis of the exploit the work presented here builds upon. Namely,
that poor random number generation in RSA keys results in insecure encryption
using these keys. Specifically, a key’s private components can be generated using
publicly available information.
The exploit explored in [7] makes use of the two prime values that play a
fundamental role in an RSA key. These values must be sufficiently random such
that repeated values are infeasible and mathematically extremely improbable to
encounter due to the scope of the set (PARIS focuses on 1024-bit keys). However,
on some systems and due to some less-than-adequate code, this may not always be
the case. When these values are repeated between keys, the greatest-common-
divisor algorithm can be applied to find the shared value between keys. This
is significant because the GCD calculation is significantly less computationally
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expensive than the alternative: factoring the large values. With this new infor-
mation about each key, the private components are straight-forward to generate
since the RSA key-generation process is public and not difficult to implement.
A large sample set was obtained via the OpenSSL Observatory and by sys-
tematically indexing numerous websites for SSL certificates (which use RSA as
an encryption scheme). Since it was thought this would provide an adequate
sample set, all these keys were analyzed. The set contained 1024-bit keys, as well
as 2048-bit keys. The findings were that 0.2% of these keys were vulnerable to
this exploit, and thus offered no security. This included 2048-bit keys as well,
despite the perception that 2048-bit keys are more secure (this would be true if
this vulnerability were avoided).
Another work that makes extensive mention of this type of vulnerability and
the random prime number problem in general is [4]. Heninger et al. focus on RSA
and DSA and implications poor random number generation can have. They also
used the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)’s release of TLS certificates from
the SSL observatory as their primary data set. Some GCD calculations are done
as well, and they are able to generate various amounts of private keys depending
on the data set.
4.2 The Process
As mentioned, the vulnerability is exploited by performing greatest common
divisor (GCD) calculations with pairs of keys. The research presented here looks
at how to most quickly and efficiently analyze a large database of RSA keys and
detect if this vulnerability is present within the set. Traditionally, this would be
a tedious process that would likely be infeasible due to time constraints. Since
17
the calculations are independent of one another (between pairs of keys) they can
be done in parallel, given the proper system. One such system, and the focus of
this work, is NVIDIA’s CUDA. This will be detailed later, however, it relates to
work done in [3].
Fujimoto’s work optimized a specific version of the GCD (binary GCD). This
method reduces the algorithm to three repeated operations. This algorithm was
then implemented in CUDA for 1024-bit numbers (something CUDA does not
offer native support for). This allows much of each operation to be performed in
a parallel fashion, further optimizing the process.
4.3 Multiple GPUs
The work done in [18] helps to make a case for the additional speedup that
making use of multiple GPUs can offer. Their work was done after CUDA had
added adequate support for using multiple GPUs simultaneously, and configura-
tions with two-GPU and four-GPU systems were used.
Significant additional speedups were gained, ranging up to three times speedup
using four GPUs over the single-GPU system (which translates to 100 times
speedup compared to the original, non-GPU benchmark being used). This kind
of speedup offers great optimism in how multiple GPUs may offer significant
increases to performance of the GCD key algorithm.
Another interesting aspect of the work done in [18] is the varied domain sizes
that were used. The data sets were broken down into several different configu-
rations which was each tested on the single, dual, or quad-GPU configuration.
This was done to achieve a more accurate answer to how much faster the multi-
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GPU system could be. The largest domain set (1024× 32× 1024), interestingly,
offered the greatest additional speedup between configurations—the quad-GPU
configuration was 3 times faster than the single-GPU, compared to 2 times for
the 256×32×256 domain. This is significant, and implies that exploring different
ways to organize our own data may offer increased advantages when moving to
a multi-GPU system.
4.4 Large Data
Wu et al. [21] explore a data set, like our own, where the data is too large to
fit within the limited memory of the GPU. Thus, the data must be partitioned.
In this work, the data was first prepared by organizing it so that it could be
effectively partitioned. There was a straightforward way of doing so for this
application (K-means).
Additionally, some features of the GPU were considered and used, namely
asynchronous memory transfer, a type of multi-tasked streaming. This feature
allows memory transfers to be done between the GPU and CPU while the GPU
is processing data it already has. This can increase performance significantly
when compared to having the GPU move from processing to data transfer (i.e.
having a single tasked thread). Optimization of threads was looked into in this
work as well, as the authors attempted to find how many of these threads would
positively impact speedup. They found that only two threads (i.e. one processing,
one transferring) were needed to gain the greatest performance benefit. Adding
additional streams after this point did not offer additional benefit.
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4.5 Optimization
As mentioned, data decomposition and organization around the architecture
are some of the most important (if not the most important) aspects of creating
a parallel solution for use with a GPGPU. The work done in [15] gives a detailed
overview of how one might optimize work done with CUDA. It discusses the
memory model, and how certain techniques such as tiling are used to optimize
the performance gains.
Unfortunately, this work was done before multi-GPU systems were fully avail-
able and accessible using CUDA. The optimization strategies presented in this
work will no doubt be useful; however, other strategies also must be employed
that consider systems with more than a single GPU (such as those mentioned here
from [18]). Leveraging techniques in both realms will offer the greatest amount
of performance gain.
4.6 Similar Algorithms
A similar algorithm that suffers from the same problems that pairwise com-
parisons does (each element much be traversed and compared), is search. The
work done in [10] explores how search can be optimized for the CUDA frame-
work. Two approaches are given to the bitonic search algorithm that is used:
the initial, most straight-forward implementation, and another implementation
optimized around the CUDA memory model. The latter offered significant per-
formance increases over the original.
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PARIS aims to be a tool that unifies the mentioned techniques and algorithms.
Currently, no practical solution exists for handling the analysis necessary to val-
idate RSA key sets. By combining the power of parallel computing and various
data decomposition techniques, PARIS allows the performance increases that lead
to a practical tool.
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Chapter 5
Algorithm
5.1 Binary GCD
Binary GCD is a well known algorithm for computing the greatest common
divisor of two numbers. Instead of relying on costly division operations like
Euclid’s algorithm, bit-wise shifts are employed. The implementation presented
in this paper follows the outline displayed in Algorithm 1.
5.2 Parallel Functions
To accomplish Algorithm 1 using CUDA, the following three functions had
to be parallelized: shift, subtract, and greater-than-or-equal. As outlined in [3],
each 1024-bit number is divided across one warp so that each thread has its own
32-bit integer.
The parallel shift function is straightforward: each thread is given an equal-
sized piece of the large-precision integer. Then each thread except for Thread 0
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Algorithm 1: Binary GCD algorithm outline
Input: x and y: two integers.
Output: The greatest common divisor of x and y.
1 repeat
2 if x and y are both even then
3 GCD(x, y) = 2 ·GCD(x
2
, y
2
);
4 else if x is even and y is odd then
5 GCD(x, y) = GCD(x
2
, y);
6 else if x is odd and y is even then
7 GCD(x, y) = GCD(y
2
, x);
8 else if x and y are both odd then
9 if x ≥ y then
10 GCD(x, y) = GCD(x−y
2
, y);
else
11 GCD(x, y) = GCD(y−x
2
, x);
end
end
until GCD(x, y) = GCD(0, y) = y;
23
receives a copy of the integer at threadID - 1. The variable threadID refers to
a value between 0 and 31 and corresponds to a thread in a warp. Each thread
shifts its value once and uses its copy of the adjacent integer to determine if a
bit has shifted between threads. This procedure is outlined in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Parallel right shift
Input: x[32] is a 1024-bit integer represented as an array of 32 ints,
threadID is the 0-31 index of the thread in warp.
1 if threadID 6= 0 then
2 temp← x[threadID − 1];
else
3 temp← 0;
end
4 x← x >> 1;
5 x← xOR (temp << 31);
The parallel subtract uses a method called carry skip from [3]. First, each
thread subtracts its piece and sets the “borrow” flag of threadID - 1 if an
underflow occurred. Next, each thread checks if it was borrowed from and if
so, decrements itself and clears the flag. Then, if another underflow occurs, the
borrow flag at threadID - 1 will be set. This continues until all the borrow flags
are cleared. An outline can be found in Algorithm 3.
The parallel greater-than-or-equal has each thread check if its integers are
equal. If this is the case, then it sets a position variable shared by the warp
to the minimum of its threadID and the current value stored in the position
variable. This is done atomically to ensure the correct value is stored. Finally,
all the threads do a greater-than-or-equal comparison with the integers specified
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Algorithm 3: Parallel subtract using “carry skip”
Input: x and y: two 1024-bit integers, threadID is the 0-31 index of the
thread in warp.
1 x[threadID]← x[threadID]− y[threadID];
2 if underflow then
3 set borrow[threadID − 1];
end
4 repeat
5 if borrow[threadID] is set then
6 x[threadID]← x[threadID]− 1;
7 if underflow then
8 set borrow[threadID − 1];
end
9 clear borrow[threadID];
end
until all borrow flags are cleared ;
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by the position variable. This function is outlined in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Parallel greater-than-or-equal-to
Input: x and y: two 1024-bit integers, threadID is the 0-31 index of the
thread in warp.
Output: True if x ≥ y; else False.
1 if x[threadID] 6= y[threadID] then
2 pos← atomicMin(threadID, pos);
end
3 return x[pos] ≥ y[pos]
5.3 Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of the binary GCD algorithm has been shown
by Stein and Valle´e (cf. [17], [19]) to have a worst case complexity of O(n2) where
n is the number of bits in the integer. The worst case is produced when each
iteration of the algorithm shifts one of its arguments only once. Since for this
application n is fixed at 1024 bits, the complexity of a single GCD calculation
can be considered to be constant time for the worst case.
To compare all the keys together, the amount of GCDs that must be calculated
grows at a rate of k2, where k is the number of keys.
5.4 Theoretical Speedup
Maximum speedup is defined in Equation 5.1:
Max Speedup =
1
1− P (5.1)
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Figure 5.1. Total percentage of CUDA implementation that is parallel
where P is the percentage of the program’s execution that can be parallelized.
This percentage is a function of the number of keys the program needs to process,
and is calculated in Equation 5.2.
P =
t · g
t · g + r · k (5.2)
where
• t = time to process a single GCD
• g = total number of GCD calculations
• r = time to read a single key
• k = total number of keys
Since g will increase significantly more rapidly than k, P (based on Equa-
tion 5.2) will approach 1 as k approaches ∞. This relationship can be observed
in Figure 5.1.
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Chapter 6
Implementation
6.1 Problem Decomposition
The RSA weakness described above demands that each key in a set be com-
pared with each other key to determine if a GCD greater than 1 exists for any
pair. Given a known set of keys, it is not known before processing the keys which
will be likely to have a GCD greater than 1; therefore, there is no way to elimi-
nate comparisons between specific pairs. The natural organization to fulfill this
requirement is a diagonally-symmetric comparison matrix of the all keys. Each
location in the matrix corresponds to a GCD comparison between two keys.
Initially, the comparison matrix seems to be an n2 solution. However, the
diagonal of the matrix created consists of unproductive GCD calculations since
these entries would compare each key with itself. Furthermore, the matrix is
symmetrical over the diagonal. Thus, only the comparisons comprising the upper
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or lower triangle of the matrix needs to be performed. Specifically,
Total number of GCD compares =
k−1∑
i=1
i (6.1)
where k is the number of keys in the set.
6.2 Grid Organization
One of the most important aspects of any CUDA implementation is the orga-
nization of the thread and block array to ensure that the architecture is appro-
priately used to its full potential. The threads array in this implementation was
organized using three dimensions. The x dimension represented the sectioning of
a 1024-bit value into individual 32-bit integers, of which there are 32.
1024 bits per key
32 bits per integer
= 32 integers per key
The remaining dimensions, y and z, were set to 4, resulting in a block of
512 threads, illustrated in Figure 6.1. This design decision was experimentally
determined. See §6.5 for details about occupancy optimizations.
32× 4× 4 = 512
The 4 · 4 dimensions of the block ensured that each block remained square
for algorithmic symmetry and simplicity. These dimensions, y and z, correspond
to how many specific keys within the list of all keys are being compared per
block. Thus, two 1024-bit keys are loaded into each 32-thread warp, which is
then processed simultaneously as a single comparison. The x dimension is chosen
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Figure 6.1. Illustration of 3 dimensional CUDA grid organization for 32 keys
30
for two reasons: 1) so one thread in this dimension would represent each of the
32-bit integers inside the key and 2) because there are 32 threads in a single
warp. Therefore, this thread-array organization ensures that compares are done
using two entire keys (separated into 32 pieces) that are scheduled to the same
warp. This eliminates warp divergence since every warp is filled and executed
with non-overlapping data.
Blocks are arranged in row-major order based on the key comparisons that
they hold. The formula for the number of blocks, B, needed for a vector of keys
of size k can be seen in Equation 6.2.
d k4e∑
i=1
i = B (6.2)
The block limit for a grid in a single dimension is 216−1 = 65535 and limits the
amount of keys that can be processed to 1444. To increase the number of blocks
available for computation, a second grid dimension was added. This increases the
theoretical maximum number of keys per kernel launch as seen in Equation 6.3.
d k4e∑
i=1
i ≤ (216 − 1)2
k ≤ 370716
(6.3)
6.3 XY Coordinate mapping
Due to the work-reduction step taken in §6.1, a traditional CUDA 2D block
arrangement (as described in §2.2) was not appropriate. The block indices that
would have been advantageous, would have wasted significant resources on the
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GPU since we only aim to do half of the work that a full 2D block grid would
provide. Therefore, the block array that was used was essentially one dimensional.
Two dimensions are used (as described in §6.2) when there are many keys that
cannot be allocated to the GPU with a single CUDA block dimension. However,
this second dimension only adds quantity to the one dimensional list, but the
indexes advantages normally realized by the CUDA block grid could not be used.
To overcome this, an XY coordinate mapping is precomputed and copied to
the GPU. This mapping is a lookup table that converts sequential block number-
ings from the upper triangular comparison matrix to x-y coordinate pairs that
would have been accurate in the full comparison matrix. This is a necessary
step due to the process of indexing into the key sets during each comparison and
looking up vulnerable keys once the process is complete.
6.4 Shared Memory
Shared memory is used to load the necessary keys from global memory. Two
arrays are created in shared memory, representing the thread-array; both three-
dimensional, 32 × 4 × 4, and have an integer loaded into each available space.
Each array represents which integers are compared at each location in the matrix.
A side effect of this organization is that each key will be repeated 4 times within
its integer array. However, this greatly simplifies the GCD algorithm so that
only a look-up into each array is needed. Since shared memory is not the limiting
factor for occupancy, it is not a priority to optimize this aspect of the design and
implementation.
Shared memory is also used within the GCD algorithm, specifically in the
greater-than-or-equal-to function, and the subtract function. In the greater-than-
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Threads per block 128 288 512 800
Occupancy 67% 94% 100% 52%
Table 6.1. Occupancy for various block dimensions
or-equal-to function, a single integer is allocated for each comparison within a
block. Within the subtract function, shared memory is utilized to represent the
borrow value for each integer.
6.5 Occupancy
Each SM can be assigned multiple blocks at the same time as long as there
are enough free registers and shared memory available. The ratio of active warps
to the maximum number of warps supported by a SM is called occupancy. On
the Fermi architecture, the maximum occupancy is achieved when there are 48
active warps running on a SM at one time. Greater occupancy gives a SM more
opportunities to schedule warps in a fashion to hide memory accesses, thus, sat-
urating a SM with many warps is favorable for increasing performance. CUDA
Fermi cards have a total of 32768 registers and 49152 bytes of shared memory per
SM. The implementation here uses 17 registers and 4762 bytes of shared memory
per block and therefore results in a maximum occupancy of 100%.
By using the CUDA occupancy calculator provided by NVIDIA (cf. [8]), a
plot can be formed comparing the threads per block with occupancy. To maintain
the same block organization outlined above, the block dimensions can be 2×2, 3×
3, 4 × 4, 5 × 5 or 128, 228, 512, 800 threads, respectively. Table 6.1 shows the
calculated occupancy for these block sizes. A block size of 512 threads was chosen
because it results in the greatest occupancy and thus the best performance.
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The occupancy calculator was used with the values produced by the scalable
implementation (§6.7) on the new Kepler hardware (§7.1.2) to ensure occupancy
was not lost. The choice of 512 threads still produces 100% occupancy. Some
of the values for the other thread counts in Table 6.1 differed, but only slightly
(< 10%).
6.6 Bit-vector
The initial approach was to allocate a large, multi-dimensional array of in-
tegers that would hold the results of the CUDA GCD calculations. This was
allocated to the GPU, so each thread could have access as needed; however, since
the number of results grew at n2, the lack of scalability in this approach was
quickly apparent. Additionally, performance decreased due to the large array
that was being sent over the PCIe bus. Memory transfers to the GPU are slow,
and must be minimized.
After more careful consideration, a new approach was implemented. This
approach has only a single bit allocated per key-compare to mark whether or
not the pair had a GCD greater than 1. In this way, only 2 bytes (16 bits = 1
bit per compare) are necessary per block (4 × 4 = 16 compares per block), as
opposed to the previous 16 · 32 · 4 = 2048 bytes. Despite not having access to the
answer immediately after returning from the kernel calculation, this approach is
more efficient since there is a theoretically small number of keys that are returned
with GCDs greater than 1 (i.e. the flag was set). This small set is then be re-
processed (GCDs calculated) using a different kernel or using a CPU algorithm.
Efficiency is also increased due to the time saved in memory transfers since there
is significantly less memory to transfer after calling the kernel.
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6.7 Arbitrary Length Key Sets
PARIS’s initial implementation [16] took into account all the above imple-
mentation details; however, it was only able to run a single CUDA kernel once.
Furthermore, comparison runs were constrained by available memory on a given
GPU, so only runs that would fit into the limited memory could be run success-
fully.
6.7.1 Further Decomposition
Decomposing the set of comparisons for an arbitrary number of keys is difficult
due to the n2 nature of the problem. The above-outlined method cannot simply
be repeated for various segments of a key set since this would cause gaps in
the results because comparisons between the segments will be missing. Thus, the
entire comparison matrix is segmented, rather than the key sets, into manageable
sections that are run sequentially.
The full comparison matrix still exists as described above: the upper trian-
gular elements of a square matrix where each entry is a GCD comparison of two
unique keys from a provided set. This upper triangle is divided into smaller
sections of two types: smaller upper triangles that lie on the diagonal, and rect-
angles that reside in the upper portion of the original matrix (see Figure 6.2).
This partitioning mechanism was chosen for several reasons, the primary of which
is that each of these divisions result in nearly identical memory requirements and
workloads that are passed to the GPU.
Depending on the size of the key set provided, it is possible that one of the
divisions shown in Figure 6.2 would still not fit into the GPU memory. In these
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Figure 6.2. A single division of the key matrix
cases, a further division is done in a similar way. The upper triangular segments
are partitioned identically as was shown in Figure 6.2, and the rectangles are
also divided into quadrants. Figure 6.3 shows the segments after two additional
division steps. This division process continues until a single segment can fit into
the GPU memory.
6.7.2 Memory Optimization
To determine when to end the division process, an upper bound for the max-
imal number of keys that can fit onto the GPU must be determined. In order to
maximize, we evaluate the memory requirements of each segment. We will use
the following values in our memory calculations:
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Figure 6.3. Three divisions of the key matrix
T = the memory needed by an upper triangular segment
of key comparisons
R = the memory required by a rectangular segment
of key comparisons
y = number of keys on the y axis being compared
x = number of keys on the x axis being compared
B = number of CUDA blocks necessary for this key set
KEY SIZE = the size (in bytes) of a key modulus (128)
XY SIZE = the size (in bytes) of the x-y coordinate (4)
GCD SIZE = the size (in bytes) necessary to hold GCD result
bits for a single block (2)
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The triangular portions along the diagonal require three allocations: the set
of keys to compare, the bit-vector to hold the GCD result, and an x-y coordinate
mapping to aid the look-up of keys within the provided set. The x-y coordinate
pair consists of two 16-bit integers (one for x, one for y), thus the 4 bytes total.
The memory calculation is shown in Equation 6.4.
T = y ·KEY SIZE +B · XY SIZE +B ·GCD SIZE (6.4)
Recall,
B =
d k4e∑
i=1
i (6.2)
where k =number of keys. We will substitute k for y in the following calculations
since they refer to the same value.
Thus,
B =
d y4e∑
i=1
i (6.5)
We will use the arithmetic sum identity[1] (Equation 6.6) to make the substitution
in Equation 6.7.
n∑
i=1
i =
1
2
n (n+ 1) (6.6)
B =
1
2
(y
4
)(y
4
+ 1
)
(6.7)
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Continuing Equation 6.4,
T = y ·KEY SIZE +B · (XY SIZE + GCD SIZE)
T = y · 128 +B · (4 + 2)
T = y · 128 +
(
1
2
(y
4
)(y
4
+ 1
))
· 6
T = 128y + 3 · y
2
16
+ 3 · y
4
T = 3 · y
2
16
+
515y
4
(6.8)
The rectangular portions also require three allocations: the set of keys in the
y direction, the set of keys in the x direction, and the bit-vector to hold the GCD
result. Equation 6.11 outlines the calculation of R. Due to the difference in shape
of these GCD results, the number of blocks will not use the same formula. Instead,
the number of blocks is just the area of the rectangle, shown in Equation 6.9.
Recall, the number of keys is divided by the dimension of the blocks described in
§6.2.
B′ =
y
4
· x
4
(6.9)
R = y ·KEY SIZE + x ·KEY SIZE +B′ ·GCD SIZE (6.10)
R = (y + x) ·KEY SIZE +B′ ·GCD SIZE
R = (y + x) · 128 +
(y
4
· x
4
)
· 2
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As mentioned (and as can be seen in Figure 6.2), x will be half of y. Thus,
R = (y +
y
2
) · 128 +
(
y
4
·
y
2
4
)
· 2
R = 128y + 64y +
(y
4
· y
4
)
R =
y2
16
+ 192y (6.11)
Comparing T and R, we can see that for key sets larger than 506 keys, T is
larger. The difference between the functions is increasing, so T will remain the
larger value. Therefore, we can use T as the upper bound for memory require-
ments.
With an equation for evaluating the maximum amount of memory required
for a specified number of keys (Equation 6.8), if a limit on memory exists, we can
determine the maximal number of keys that can fit within that memory. CUDA
offers a function to query the total amount of memory a device has available (we’ll
call this F ). With this value, Equation 6.12 can be used to find the number of
keys, y.
T ≤ F
3 · y
2
16
+
515y
4
≤ F
3 · y
2
16
+
515y
4
− F ≤ 0
3 · y2 + 4 · 515y − 16 · F ≤ 0
y =
−b±√b2 − 4 · a · c
2a
with a = 3, b = 2060, c = −16F
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we disregard the ‘-’ since we can’t have a negative number of keys
y =
1
6
(
−2060 +
√
20602 − 192 · F
)
(6.12)
Equation 6.12 is used to find a maximum number of keys for a GPU. The
complete comparison matrix is then segmented as described above until the size
of a segment is smaller than this maximal y. The matrix is then iterated over
until all results are computed.
6.8 Multiple GPUs
PARIS also offers multi-GPU support. The workflow is separated in a differ-
ent manner so that each GPU can be as efficient as possible. A CUDA stream
is created for each GPU in the system and each is used to assign the work to
GPU. A stream is a set of CUDA commands that will execute in issue-order
on the GPU. The first work added to the stream is all necessary memory alloca-
tions. Then, the comparison sets described in §6.7.1 are queued for copying using
asynchronous memory copies (cudaMemcpyAsync), followed by the launching the
kernel to perform the work, and copying the results back to host memory. The
memory allocated for the results is page-locked (or “pinned”). This means that
this memory is no longer page-able, but it gives the GPU direct access to the
memory, greatly increasing memory bandwidth. Once the work is finished, all
results are processed for each GPU.
During our tests, two Tesla K20Xms were used. Details about the test setup
can be found in §7.1.2.
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6.9 Generating the Private Key
Once all key comparisons have been processed and the GPU work is complete,
the bit-vector is inspected for “1”s signifying a vulnerable key was found. When a
“1” is found, the GCD needs to be calculated to generate the private key. As was
shown in Figure 2.1, the result of the GCD calculation will be one of the original
prime values. Each of the two moduli that was used in the GCD calculation
is then divided by this value to calculate the other corresponding primes. The
totient (φ) is calculated using the primes. Finally d is the result of finding the
modular multiplicative inverse of φ and e (also contained in the public key).
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Chapter 7
Experimental Setup
7.1 Test Machine
7.1.1 Initial Setup
All performance measurements were made on a single machine with an Intel
Xeon W3503 dual-core CPU and 4 GB of RAM. This machine has one NVIDIA
GeForce GTX 480 GPU with 480 CUDA cores and 1.5 GB of memory. The
CUDA driver version present on the machine is 4.2.0, release 302.17, the runtime
version is 4.2.9. The CUDA compute capability is version 2.0, and the maximum
threads per block is 1024, with each warp having 32 threads.
7.1.2 Updated Setup
An updated hardware configuration was used to generate more current results.
The CPU in the new configuration is an Intel Xeon E5-2650 8-core CPU. It runs
at 2.00 GHz with 64 GB of RAM. The NVIDIA Tesla K20Xm GPU was used for
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testing. It has 2688 CUDA cores and 6GB of memory. It has compute capability
3.5 and we use the NVIDIA driver version 304.88. The maximum threads and
warp statistics remain the same.
7.2 Reference Implementations
In order to check the accuracy of the final implementation, as well as to
provide a point of comparison for benchmarking, two reference implementations
of this exploit were created. Each was able to use the same format key databases
(described in §7.3).
The first implementation was written purely in Python using the open source
PyCrypto cryptography library. This implementation was able to perform the
entire exploit, from finding weak 1024-bit RSA public keys through generating
the discovered private keys. This implementation was not used for performance
comparison as it was dissimilar to the other two implementations. However, it
was used to validate the exploit itself and serve as an algorithm reference.
A sequential version of the binary GCD algorithm was implemented to serve as
a second validation tool for the CUDA implementation. This version sequentially
processed the same input as both other implementations and produced output of
the same format. Comparison with this implementation ensured that unexpected
errors did not result merely from processing the data in parallel.
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7.3 Test Sets
In order to conduct meaningful tests, it was necessary to use an identical data
set in all tests. To facilitate this, a tool was written in Python to generate both
regular and intentionally weak RSA key pairs using PyCrypto and store them in
an SQLite3 database. All keys were generated with a constant e of 65537, chosen
because this was discovered to be a commonly used value (cf. [7]).
The generation process produced a database of RSA key pairs. Intentionally
weak keys were evenly distributed.
In order to generate a weak key, this program would generate an initial normal
RSA key but save the prime used for p. For each subsequent bad key, p would
be replaced with this constant, and n was recalculated. The result was that each
weak key would have a GCD greater than 1 when tested against any other weak
key, namely, p.
Using this tool, it was possible to build arbitrarily large test sets with a known
number of keys exhibiting the weakness. When these databases were processed
using any of the reference implementations, the discovered number of weak keys
could be directly compared with the number of keys expected to be found. This
allowed both repeatable testing to measure run time, and a method to validate
PARIS was indeed finding GCDs as expected.
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Chapter 8
Results
8.1 Initial Implementation
The accuracy of the parallel implementation was verified against the sequen-
tial implementation by using identical test data sets with known weak keys. Since
both implementations found the same set of compromised keys, it was validated
that these two implementations were internally consistent. Furthermore, both
matched the results of the separate Python reference implementation: support-
ing the assertion of accurate functionality. The speedup of the CUDA implemen-
tation (seen in Figure 8.1) was calculated by comparing its run time with that
of the sequential implementation. Compare this with Figure 5.1: this similar-
ity is evidence of the implementation presented here matching with theoretical
expectations.
Figure 8.1 shows that speedup increases dramatically with the number of keys
until about 2000 comparisons. At this point, the GPU becomes saturated with
enough blocks to fully occupy all of the SMs. Speedup remains constant at 27.5
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Figure 8.1. Speedup of CUDA Implementation to Sequential C++ using GTX
480
Number of Keys 20 200 2000 20000 200000
Sequential Time (sec) 0.13 5.59 550.69 55121.86 185551.91
CUDA Time (sec) 0.21 0.31 20.21 2005.09 6748.23
Speedup 0.6 18.0 27.2 27.5 27.5
Table 8.1. Run-times of sequential and CUDA implementations on GTX 480
for up to 200000 keys. We have no data beyond this number of keys due to the
very long run time of the sequential implementation.
8.2 Scalable Implementation
With the new hardware, PARIS was able to achieve increased speedup of 33.9
as seen in Figure 8.2 and Table 8.2. These advances are due to the architectural
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Figure 8.2. Speedup of CUDA Implementation to Sequential C++ using Tesla
K20Xm
improvements including more CUDA cores and more memory. The dashed line
in Figures 8.2, and 8.4 represent extrapolated data. Previous data became pre-
dictable, increasing by a factor of approximately 100 with each subsequent run.
The runtime for a 200, 000 key set was too generated by increasing the previous
run by the average increase of the last three runs: 98.562.
Number of Keys 20 200 2000 20000 200000
CPU runtime (sec) 0.045 4.084 438.093 42784.697 (4216964.473)
Single GPU runtime (sec) 0.984 1.119 13.643 1260.655 126946.519
Speedup 0.046 3.650 32.111 33.938 33.218
Table 8.2. Run-times of sequential and CUDA implementations on the Tesla
K20Xm with scalable implementation
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Figure 8.3. Speedup of Multi-GPU to Single GPU using Tesla K20Xm (x2)
8.3 Multiple GPUs
Figure 8.3 shows the results achieved when multiple (2) GPUs were utilized.
The speedup when the GPUs were being fully utilized was near 2.0, the ideal
value. The proximity achieved relative to the ideal value supports the scalability
of PARIS’s implementation.
Since near-ideal speedup was achieved when moving from single GPU to mul-
tiple GPUs, the speedup when compared to the sequential CPU implementation
also increased significantly, seen in Figure 8.4. During peak operation (the ex-
periment with highest speedup), PARIS achieved an average of 316, 764 GCD
calculations per second. Table 8.3 displays more details concerning the multiple
GPU runs.
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Figure 8.4. Speedup of Multi-GPU to Sequential CPU using Tesla K20Xm (x2)
Number of Keys 20 200 2000 20000 200000
CPU runtime (sec) 0.045 4.084 438.093 42784.697 (4216964.473)
Single GPU runtime (sec) 0.984 1.119 13.643 1260.655 126946.519
Multiple GPU runtime (sec) 0.982 1.054 7.346 631.417 67838.397
Speedup (GPUx2 / GPU) 1.002 1.062 1.857 1.997 1.871
Speedup (GPUx2 / CPU) 0.046 3.875 59.637 67.760 62.162
Table 8.3. Run-times of sequential and CUDA implementations on the Tesla
K20Xm
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Validation of computer security is a non-trivial problem. Increasing security
measures such as larger encryption keys significantly increase the time of many
methods that might be used to validate computer security. These runtimes are
often so long that it is not realistic to complete the validation.
PARIS allows for efficient and complete comparisons of a set of 1024-bit RSA
public keys, avoiding repetition and unnecessary work. This tool allows an in-
creased number of keys to be compared to prior work, in turn allowing overall
execution time to decrease due to the increased parallelism.
PARIS offers significant advantages over other GCD algorithms in CUDA,
and practically applies this for comparison of 1024-bit RSA keys in order to test
for a particular weakness.
Efficient scalability is one of the largest advantages PARIS has to offer. It
scales to sets of keys of arbitrary size, and also scales efficiently to multiple GPUs.
These scalability capabilities allow PARIS to be applied in a variety of situations
where available resources can be taken advantage of to obtain the highest possible
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performance.
PARIS will continue to live as an open-sourced software project [20]. We
hope that this enables further development, especially in the areas outlined in
Chapter 10.
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Chapter 10
Future Work
The Kepler architecture introduces new features that may increase the perfor-
mance of this implementation. A feature known as Dynamic Parallelism allows
a CUDA kernel to launch new kernels from the GPU. This would allow dynamic
allocation of block sizes for different areas of the comparison matrix and remove
idle threads from the kernel. Hyper-Q is a new technology that manages multiple
CUDA kernels from multiple CPU threads. With the current Fermi architecture,
only one CUDA kernel may run on the device at one time. This can lead to under
utilization of the GPU hardware. An approach using multiple CPU threads, each
running their own CUDA kernel, could greatly increase throughput.
We would like to see PARIS maintain a database of keys with unique primes
that it would store after each run. Additionally, it would not only do a full
comparison of all new keys provided to it, but it would use its own key store to
increase the size of the matrix, and lead to a more complete check.
PARIS is still limited to 1024-bit keys due to how well they fit with cur-
rent CUDA specifications. While the ideal goal for PARIS would the ability to
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compare keys of arbitrary length, a more reachable goal would be extension to
2048-bit keys. As mentioned in §6.2, each thread stores a single 4-byte (32-bit)
integer which is a section of the RSA key. CUDA offers support for a long long
type, which would offer 64 bits of storage space per thread. Leaving the rest of
the kernel implementation identical, it seems as though it might be a straightfor-
ward addition that would allow PARIS to validate a much larger, more relevant
(see §3.4) set of keys.
One of our related works [4] mentions an alternative method of GCD calcu-
lations that was able to provide them with significant speedups. This method
focuses on multiplications of large (in our case, 1024-bit) values as opposed to
many GCD calculations. It is unclear whether this would be advantageous given
how CUDA handles data and manages its resources; nonetheless, it would be
interesting to investigate algorithmic changes that could increase our speedup.
PARIS could also be applied in a way that would provide a metric for in-
dividual system prime generation evaluation. To accomplish this, large sets of
keys would need to be generated on the system to be evaluated. Once complete,
PARIS could be used to check these large sets for poor primes. Based on the
number of primes that were found, a metric could be given that assessed how
bad the random number generator on the system was. This kind of functionality
would offer a simple way to check particular machines for a fundamental prob-
lem, and PARIS would offer a way to accomplish this that is much quicker than
previous methods.
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